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INTRODUCTION 
In 1277, Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris condemned two hundred and 
nineteen  propositions,  most  inspired  by  Aristotelian  thought,  at  the 
university there. With this condemnation, he cut short the academic debate 
about the latest theological developments, i.e.,  the reception of Aristotle's 
teaching. This was the first time that a whole coherent understanding of 
the world had come under attack, as  opposed to the condemnation of an 
individual or a few  theses.  The  condemnation of 1277  had astonishing 
unintended consequences. Even if most people would not agree with the 
brave statement of Pierre Duhem, that the condemnation of 1277 marked 
the birthday of  modern science, it still had far-reaching effects.1 In this essay, 
I shall explore some of  the unintended consequences of  the condemnation of 
1277. In particular, I shall discuss the impact of  the insistence on the absolute 
freedom of God. This will take place in two steps. First, I shall examine the 
reception of the condemnation in the work of Duns Scotus. Second, I shall 
investigate two areas in the development of  Western thinking in which the 
impact of the condemnation was felt,  namely, the development of modern 
science and the theological understanding of God. Before we  can embark 
on this discussion, however, I will need to provide some background on the 
developments leading to the condemnation and the condemnation itself. 
BACKGROUND 
The rediscovery of the corpus of Aristotle's writings was a major upheaval 
in mediaeval intellectual culture. This began in the early twelfth century 
and lasted until around 1270. At this point, all works of Aristotle bar a few 
writings had been translated and incorporated into the body oflearning. 
It must be noted that it was not the "pure" Aristotle that was incorporated 
into Western learning. Most texts came via Arab translations, and together 
1 Pierre Duhem, Le  Systinne  du  Monde:  Histoire  des  Doctrines  Cosmologiques  de  Platon  cl 
Copemic (Paris: Hermann, 1954), 66. 
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which Aristotle was read. The great Arab philosophers, such as Al-Farabi 
(al-Farabi),  Avicenna  (ibn Sina),  Algazel  (al-Ghazali)  and Averroes  (ibn 
Rushd), read Aristotle through the eyes  of neo-Platonic philosophy, and 
thus "platonised" Aristotle. This was in line with the approach of the neo-
Platonic philosophers in late antiquity, who harmonized Plato and Aristotle 
at the cost of  platonising the latter. In addition, the Liber de Causis (Book of 
the Causes, ninth century), a work which was falsely attributed to Aristotle, 
consisted of  a modified excerpt from the neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus' 
Elements of  Theology. This book became highly influential and coloured the 
interpretation of all other Aristotelian writings.2  Thus the Aristotelianism 
that developed in the universities in the twelfth century was not strictly 
speaking Aristotelian,  but a  platonised version  of Aristotelian  thinking 
interpreted by the Arab philosophers. Consequently, it has been suggested 
that the term Arab Peripatetic philosophy is more appropriate.  3 
The  incorporation  of Aristotle  and his  Arab  commentators  into  the 
Western body of learning was  a  major  revolution.  However,  there was 
significant continuity in theological thinking throughout this period, and 
some fundamental assumptions remained constant throughout the Middle 
Ages.  For example, it was  commonly assumed throughout the early and 
high Middle Ages  up to the end of the thirteenth century that God was 
essentially linked to creation and, notwithstanding God's  transcendence, 
immanent and present in the world. Augustine and the mediaeval tradition 
up to the rediscovery of  Aristotle would understand this in terms of  the neo-
Platonic concept of  emanation, although theologians would avoid this term 
because of its neo-Platonist connotations and implications for the freedom 
of God.  Once theologians  and philosophers were  adopting Aristotelian 
thought forms, they would understand this relation in terms of causality. 
Nevertheless, both approaches saw God as  essentially linked to creation, 
transcendent and yet immanent. It was only in the fourteenth century that 
this mediaeval consensus would be broken. 
2  Dennis  J.  Brand,  The  Book  of Causes:  Liber  de  Causis  (2nd  ed.;  Milwaukee:  Marquette 
University Press, 1984), 4-8. 
3 Alain de Libera, La Querelle  des Universaux: De Platon a  Ia Fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Ed. du 
Seuil, 1996), 109-10. 
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THE  CONDEMNATION  OF  1277 
The Aristotelian revolution took several forms.  On the one hand we find 
moderate  theologians  such  as  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  incorporated  a 
Christianized peripatetic philosophy into a  Christian world view.  Other 
scholars, mainly in the arts faculty, were much more radical. They applied 
Aristotle and the Arab philosophers consistently. The most famous of  these 
were Boethius of  Dacia and Siger of  Brabant. 
Such  an  intellectual  revolution  cannot  be  without  its  detractors. 
Conservative theologians, such as Bonaventure and Henry of  Ghent, argued 
strongly against the use of  Aristotelianism in philosophy and theology. While 
the intellectual argument on the merits (or lack thereof) of Aristotelianism 
or Peripatism was still in full swing, the church authorities took action. 
There had been attempts to stop the Aristotelian revolution throughout 
the thirteenth century, yet mostly without lasting success. The first attempt 
was  the proscription of Aristotelian teaching  at Paris  by the provincial 
councilofSens in 1210, and was repeated by  the papallegate in Paris in 1215. 
This appears to have been effective for about twenty years, but eventually the 
condemnation was simply forgotten or ignored.4 In fact, by the mid-1250s 
the statutes of the university even prescribed the majority of Aristotle's 
works to be studied and taught.  5 We can safely assume that by this point the 
university was dominated by Aristotelianism. 
The next attempt to halt the Aristotelian revolution was in 1270, when 
Bishop  Tempier  issued  a  list  of thirteen  theses  prohibiting Aristotelian 
teaching. This does not appear to have met with success; they were phrased 
so loosely that the philosophers, schooled in subtle thought, found it easy 
to circumvent this prohibition.6 On January 18, 1277, however, Pope John 
XXI instructed the bishop to investigate rumours ofheretical teaching at the 
university and report to him. Stephen Tempier established a commission to 
investigate this, and on the 7th of March 1277 the bishop issued a syllabus 
of 219 condemned theses? This list was aimed not only at key contents of 
4 Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles Latinus;' in The Cambridge History of  Later Medieval Philosophy 
(eds Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 71. 
5 Dod, "Aristoteles Latinus;' 73. 
6 Kurt Flasch, Aufkliirung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277: Das Dokument des Bischofs 
von Paris (6 vols; Excerpta Classica; Mainz: Dieterich, 1989), 6:50-51. 
7 There is  no English translation of the text. There are two recent editions of the Latin text, 
one with a German translation (Flasch, Aufkliirung im  Mittelalter?)  and one with a French 
translation (David Piche, La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277: Nouvelle Edition du Texte Latin 
(Sic et Non; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2002). 
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This condemnation marked an important triumph for a highly conservative 
group  within  the  university,  which  had  followed  the  introduction  of 
Aristotelian  teaching  with  suspicion.  8  Leading  members  of that group, 
among them Henry of Ghent, who was an outspoken opponent of the use 
of Peripatetic thinking in philosophy and theology, were also members of 
the bishop's commission that investigated the claims. Given their familiarity 
with the tendencies within the university, it is not surprising that they were 
able to compile the list of errors within a short space of  time - about three 
weeks.9 
The document identified a whole body  of  unacceptable teaching. The main 
direction of  the condemnation appears to have been any limitation on the 
freedom of  God.
10 The radical Aristotelians had taught that God was limited 
by the laws of (Aristotelian) science. So what was impossible according to 
nature (i.e., Aristotelian physics) was also impossible for God. Articles such 
as  nos. 34 ("The first cause (i.e.  God) cannot make many worlds")" and 
49  ("God cannot move heaven in a linear movement. The  reason is  that 
this would leave a vacuum:')
12 are both not so much about the existence of 
multiple worlds or the movement of  the heavens, but about God's freedom. 
According to Aristotelian physics both things are impossible, and so God, 
being subject to nature, cannot violate these laws. 
So the condemnation of these articles affirms the absolute freedom of 
God, that God is not bound by science and that God can act against the 
laws of  nature. The authors of  the condemnation did not mean to assert that 
God would ever do this - i.e., create multiple worlds or move the heavens 
in a linear movement - but that God could if God wanted to. Thus the very 
foundations of a naturalistic and scientific world view were  attacked.  A 
scientific world view is dependent on the reliability of  the natural order, but 
this is not given if  one assumes a God who is free to act against nature. We 
will need to come back to this. 
Related to this is the relation between the divine intellect and the divine 
will.  This  rejects  an understanding of the will  and the intellect that was 
8 John F.  Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277;' The Modern Schoolman 
72 (1995): 239. 
9 Flasch, Aujkliirung im Mittelalter?, 55. 
10 Edward Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power and Physical Thought in 
the Late Middle Ages;' Viator 10 (1979): 212-13. 
11 Flasch, Aujkliirung im Mittelalter?,  131. My translation. 
12 Flasch, Aujkliirung im Mittelalter?,  147. My translation. 
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proposed by Thomas Aquinas. He thought that the will follows the intellect. 
Thus if  a possible course of  action is recognised as good, then the will wills 
this. And if we act wrongly, which, as human beings, unfortunately we are 
bound to do, then this is because the intellect has misjudged the possible 
course of action, or has erred in its conclusions on what is  good for the 
person. Art. 208 explicitly rejects this position and states the primacy of  the 
will over the intellect.B 
Another area of  condemned teaching was the issue of  individuation. The 
underlying question here is how an individual is actually individuated from 
common nature; so what makes a single horse an individual as distinct from 
general horse-nature? Thomas Aquinas had suggested a simple solution to 
this question: "matter is the principle of  individuation:'14 Thus the members 
of  a species are individuated by their distinct material appearance, including 
all accidents. Thus a horse is a horse by virtue of having the nature "horse" 
and a distinct body. 
This, however, would become problematic when applied to angels. Angels, 
obviously, have no body, and therefore no matter; they are pure formsY As 
matter is the individuating principle among members of one species, one 
can only speak of individual angels if one attributes an individual species 
to each  angel.  Otherwise  there  would  be only one  "angelness"  without 
individuation.16  To  the modern mind, this issue seems somewhat arcane, 
but, as we will see, this question has important repercussions in areas more 
relevant. At  any rate, the bishop's commission in Paris took it sufficiently 
seriously to condemn it, and so Art. 81 explicitly condemns that each angel 
is a separate species. The notion that matter is the individuating principle 
was condemned in Articles 96 and 97Y 
Other articles were concerned with a large number of  propositions which 
were seen to be heretical, for example that the human intellect is  eternal 
(Art. 31) and that there is only one intellect for all people (Art. 32). There 
were also other theses condemned, such as a series of theses on Christian 
morals, like Art. 183: "Simple fornication, i.e. between an unmarried man 
and an unmarried woman, is no sin:' 
13 Flasch, Aufkliirung im Mittelalter?, 252-53. 
14  "individuationis principium materia es" in Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia  (Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam Jun., 1979), 12. 
15 ST 1, q. 50, a. 2. 
16 ST 1, q.  50, a. 4. 
17 Flasch, Aufkliirung im Mittelalter?, 168-69. 
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knowledge  were  at  stake  with  the condemnation of 1277.  On the  one 
hand,  there  was  the  new learning,  which  was  open to new influences, 
tried to understand the world in a scientific manner, and did not avoid the 
problems arising from this encounter. On the other hand, there was the old 
world view, which gave absolute authority to the church, its traditions and 
its representatives, the proponents of a traditional Christian world view.18 
Unlike in similar modern debates on traditional religious world views and 
openness to science, such as  the debate on intelligent design/creationism 
and science, or on women's ministry in the church or the church's acceptance 
of  homosexual people, it appears that the church could change the terms of 
the debate by the authority of  the bishop. 
Today, even if the church attempts to silence heterodox voices, such as 
Hans Kung or Leonardo Boff, this does not stop the debate, it just moves it 
into a different forum. Even when, from 1910 to 1967, all Roman Catholic 
clergy and office  holders  had to swear  the "Oath  against  Modernism;' 
this did not stop the modern scientific world view. It merely excluded the 
Roman Catholic Church from the debate about faith  and science. In the 
days of  Bishop Tempier, however, such a condemnation had to be respected, 
especially as  it was  not an isolated event. It is  recognised that Pope John 
XXI intended to back the condemnation, which, however, he could not do 
due to his accidental death on May 20 of that year.19 In addition, only a few 
days after the condemnation in Paris, the Archbishop of Canterbury issued 
a similar syllabus of  condemned teaching, mainly directed at the University 
of  Oxford.20 
This is not to say that the debate was stopped instantly. The Dominicans 
continued to defend their great teacher Thomas Aquinas, and Aristotle and 
his Arab commentators continued to be read widely. However, the terms of 
the theological discourse changed, and theologians as well as philosophers 
would take note of the condemned theses and avoid teaching them. There 
is  evidence that the condemnation was  widely accepted as  authoritative, 
for  example  among the Franciscans,  for  whom it became highly useful 
in their rivalry with the Dominicans. Franciscan theologians everywhere 
were  obliged to  adhere to the condemnation from  1279,  and a number 
of significant universities  enforced the condemnation through their by-
18 Flasch, Aujkliirung im Mittel alter?, 84. 
19 Flasch, Aufkliirung im Mittelalter?, 53-55. 
2°  Flasch, Aufkliirung im Mittelalter?, 60-61. 
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laws.
21  Grant has also presented a large body of evidence of quotations of 
and direct allusions to the condemnation in the work oflater philosophers 
and theologians, such as John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Thomas 
Bradwardine and Jean Buridan.
22 Mahoney enlarged the list of people who 
quoted the condemnation significantly,  and extended its  reach into the 
sixteenth century.
23 Thus the condemnation of 1277 became internationally 
recognised and changed the development of  Western thinking significantly. 
However, this did not return the debate to the neo-Platonic Augustinian 
theology of  Henry of Ghent, Bonaventure and others. Instead, it moved the 
debate forward, into previously uncharted waters. 
THE  CONSEQUENCES 
The insistence on the absolute freedom of  God in the articles of  1277 had 
enormous consequences for Western thinking, even if  Duhem's bold thesis, 
which was also taken up by Gilson, that the condemnation of 1277 marked 
the birthday of  modern science has been widely discredited. 24 Some authors 
assume that the impact of  the condemnation on the development of  Western 
thinking is  negligible,
25  while others argue that the condemnation was  a 
significant contribution to the later developments.26 A third group argues 
that the condemnation was an important contribution to the new directions 
21  Luca Bianchi, "1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?" in What is  Philosophy in 
the Middle Ages? (eds Jan Aertsen and Andreas Speer; Berlin: W.  de Gruyter,  1998), 97.  See 
also Luca Bianchi, Censure et Liberte Intellectuel/e  cl  l'Universite de Paris (Paris: Belles Lettres, 
1999), 207-17. 
22 Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277;' 228-39 (Scotus, p. 236; Ockham, p. 237; Bradwardine, 
pp. 237-38; Buridan, pp. 237-38). 
23 Edward P.  Mahoney, "Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 in Later Medieval and 
Renaissance Philosophy;' in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 (eds Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery and 
Andreas Speer; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2001), 902-30. 
24 Duhem, Le  Systeme  du  Monde,  66;  Etienne Gilson, History of Christian  Philosophy in  the 
Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 387-410. For the state of the debate, see Kent 
Emery and Andreas Speer, "After the Condemnation of 1277: New Evidence, New Perspectives, 
and Gounds for New Interpretations;' in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 (  eds Jan Aerts en, Kent 
Emery and Andreas Speer; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2001), 3-19. 
25  For example John E.  Murdoch, "1277 and Late Medieval Natural Philosophy;' in What is 
Philosophy  in  the Middle Ages? (eds Jan Aertsen and Andreas Speer; Berlin: W.  de  Gruyter, 
1998),  111-21;  and Jan  Pinborg, "Zur Philosophie des  Boethius de  Dacia. Ein Uberblick;' 
Studia Mediewistyczne 15 (1974): 164-85. 
26 Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277"; Edward Grant, God and Reason  in  the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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27 
It is, obviously, impossible to speculate what would have happened without 
the condemnation. Certain developments - we cannot know which - may 
have taken place regardless. Others may not have taken place. Even if  it was 
shown that the effect of the condemnation itself was minimal, Emery and 
Speer suggest that it "does indeed signify or symbolize some critical turning 
point in the history of medieval thinking:'
28 
I shall now examine the reception of the condemnation in the work of 
Duns Scotus, in order to show how philosophy and theology in the fourteenth 
century adapted to the restrictions imposed by the condemnation. Then I 
shall investigate two areas in which the effects of the condemnation were 
felt, its impact on the development of modern science and the theological 
understanding of  God. 
RECEPTION  OF  THE  CONDEMNATION  IN  JOHN  DUNS 
SCOTUS 
I outlined three areas that concerned Bishop Tempier and his commission 
above, namely, the freedom of God, the relation between intellect and will 
and  individuation. We can see in  all three areas Duns Scotus remaining firmly 
within the new boundaries to theological and philosophical investigation. 
However, we will also see that he did not return to the Augustinian and neo-
Platonic theology of  the opponents of  the new thinking, but moved forward 
into previously uncharted regions. 
With regard to the freedom of God, theologians after the condemnation 
of 1277  emphasised the distinction between the absolute power of God 
(potentia  dei  absoluta)  and  the  ordained  power  of God  (potentia  dei 
ordinata) much more than their predecessors. This distinction was nothing 
new. At least from the eleventh century onwards we find this concept deeply 
embedded in Western  theology,  and we  can find  related  motifs  in the 
writings of  St Augustine. 
In short, the absolute power of  God is the assurance of  God's omnipotence. 
God can do absolutely everything God wills. It safeguards God's freedom. 
The ordained power of God safeguards God's reliability. God may be able 
to do everything, but God does not will to,  because God has committed 
27 For example Bianchi, "1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?;' 105-1  0; Luca Bianchi, 
"New Perspectives on the Condemnation of 1277 and its Aftermath;' Recherches de Iheologie et 
Philosophie Medievales 70 (2003): 219; and Flasch, Aujkli:irung Im Mittelalter?, 276-77. 
28 Emery and Speer, "After the Condemnation of 1277;' 18. 
Colloquium 41/1 2009 < 
godself to the  order  God has  created.  Thus  God could have  created  a 
completely different world, multiple worlds or even no world at all, but once 
God created this one, God is reliable within the system, both of  natural laws 
and of  the economy of  salvation. 
Before  the end of the thirteenth century,  the emphasis was  on God's 
reliability. Theologians such as Albertus Magnus and Bonaventure identified 
the ordained power of God with the total preordained, providential will 
of God. This was then further identified with God's goodness and justice. 
Consequently, the hypothesis of an alternative order, although notionally 
kept up, was really merely an empty construct. God was totally reliable and 
committed to the present order.
29 
Thomas Aquinas emphasised the freedom of God much more than his 
older contemporaries. He suggested that God is  omnipotent and can do 
everything that does not lead to a contradiction. 
30 However, God's absolute 
power is restricted by what God has willed from eternity and preordained. 
31 
Thus God will continue to will what God once decided to do; God's will is 
unchangeable and thus is reliable.  32 In addition, God's power is also related 
to  God's  essence.  Although God's  actions  are  not determined by  God's 
nature, the world is  directed towards God's goodness as  its ultimate final 
cause.33  However, because God's goodness exceeds all earthly things, there 
are  different ways  in which God's goodness could have been manifest in 
creation. Even if God could have created another world, it would have had 
to be one that would have been in accordance with God's goodness. 
34 So for 
Thomas, God is  absolutely powerful and God's will is absolutely free, but 
the power and will are circumscribed in a way so that God is reliable. This 
circumscription, however, was not by the laws of  natural science, but by the 
previous decision of God. 
The radical Aristotelians of  the arts faculty went much further than this. 
They had subordinated God's will under the laws  of natural philosophy, 
so  that  God  could  not  do  anything  impossible  in  Aristotelian  natural 
philosophy, such as doing something that would result in the existence of a 
29 William J.  Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages:· 
in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian 
Perspectives (ed. Tamar Rudavsky; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), 250. 
30 ST I, q. 25, a. 3. 
31 ST I, q. 25, a. 5. 
32 STI, q.  19, a. 7. 
33 ST I, q. 25, a. 5. 
34 ST I, q. 25, a. 5. 
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and thus impossible).35 So not even God could bring about a vacuum. The 
condemnation was  directed against this limitation of divine freedom  in 
the name of Aristotelian physics. Thus if the thesis was condemned that 
God cannot move the heavens in a straight line, because this would leave a 
vacuum (Art. 49), then this did not imply that one should believe that God 
was going to do this, but that God could do this if God wanted to, probably 
assuming that God was not going to will it. In the same way, when the thesis 
was condemned that God cannot create multiple worlds (Art. 34), then this 
did not imply that Bishop Tempier meant to provoke thought-experiments 
about multiple universes, but merely that he condemned the denial of God's 
omnipotence.  36 
In line  with  the requirements of the condemnation, in Duns Scotus' 
work the absolute power of God obtains  a new,  prominent status.  This 
is  intimately related  to his  understanding of the relation between  God 
and creation, because for Scotus, creation is an act of God's free will in a 
new and radical way.  For Scotus, God has before God's mind an infinite 
number of  worlds, which contain various combinations of  natures (beings). 
From among these combination of beings,  or,  to use Leibniz'  somewhat 
anachronistic but fitting phrase, from these possible worlds God, by God's 
will,  chooses one.  37  Thus Scotus has, while safeguarding, in line with the 
requirements of  the condemnation of 1277, God's freedom, cut the essential 
relation between God and creation. Creation, as  Scotus understands it,  is 
not an expression of God's being any more, but a contingent decision of 
God's will. 38  In this context, Scotus' understanding of the relation between 
will and intellect becomes relevant. Here, Scotus, in line with Art. 208 of 
the condemnation of 1277, emphasises the dominance of the will over the 
35 Physics IV, 6-9. 
36 Flasch, Aujkliirung im Mittelalter?, 131. 
37 Etienne Gilson, Johannes Duns Scotus: Einfiihrung in die Grundgedanken seiner Lehre (trans. 
Werner Dettloff; Dusseldorf: L. Schwann, 1959), 633. See also Reinhold Seeberg, Die 7heologie 
des Johannes Duns Scotus: Eine Dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung (Studien Zur Geschichte 
Der 1heologie Und Der Kirche 5; Leipzig: Dieterich, 1900), 159. Note that, although Seeberg's 
book is quite old, it is  still one of the standard works on the topic. See Richard Cross, Duns 
Scotus (Great Medieval1hinkers; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 154, n. 6. Knuutilla 
observed that Leibniz' notion of "the best of all possible worlds" was already anticipated by 
Scotus. Simo Knuuttila, "Modal Logic;' in The Cambridge History of  Later Medieval Philosophy 
(eds Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 355. 
38 David B. Burrell, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Challenges in Contemporary 
Theology; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 178. 
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intellect. We recall that for Thomas Aquinas, the will followed the intellect. 
In contrast to  Aquinas'  intellectualist  understanding,  Duns  Scotus  sets 
his voluntarist understanding of human and divine decision making. The 
intellect sets before the mind a range of possible courses of action, and the 
will makes a decision between them. 
Thus it is  not for any recognised good that God chooses one possible 
creation over another, but for the reasons unknown to humankind. It needs 
to be added, however, that God will not will anything that contradicts God's 
own goodness. 
39 Thus the world, although contingent, is directed towards 
God's goodness. We  recall that for  Thomas, the world was  an expression 
of God's being, although not the only one possible. However, the emphasis 
in Thomas' theology was the essential relation between God and the world 
as well as the reliability of God. The freedom of God, in this case that God 
could have created another expression of God's goodness, is not a primary 
thought at all, and plays a subordinate role. This is different in the thought 
of  Duns Scotus. For Scotus, the freedom of God's will is of  primary interest, 
and the relation of creation to God's being - i.e., to God's goodness - is of 
secondary interest. Thus the emphasis is  on the contingency of creation. 
William of  Ockham would take another important step in the direction that 
Duns Scotus showed. For William of Ockham, God's will makes decisions 
without reference to the divine essence. 
Duns Scotus' understanding of the relation between God and creation 
is also influenced by his strong emphasis on the distinction of powers, i.e., 
between  God's  absolute  power  (potentia  absoluta)  and  ordained  power 
(potentia ordinata). We have seen above that, although this distinction had 
been known since the eleventh century, it did not play a significant part 
in the theological discussion.  In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
century, however, the distinction received great significance, as it was needed 
to safeguard God's freedom. We find the beginning of  this development in 
the thought of Duns Scotus. 
For Duns Scotus, God can do different things according to God's absolute 
power (potentia absoluta) than God can do within the realm of  the ordained 
power (potentia  ordinata).  Scotus identifies the ordained power with the 
laws of  nature, which God established when God created the world. Because 
God is the giver of  these laws, God is also in a position to act independently 
of them, just as,  in late  mediaeval political theory, the king,  who is  the 
39 See berg, Die 1heologie des johannes Duns Scotus,  162-63. 
Jensen:  Condemnation of  1277  67 lawgiver, can act above the law.40 When God acts above the law, however, 
this is not outside the law. Instead, God sets new law. So if  God acted against 
the established order, and God could do this if God wanted to, then God 
would change this order. Thus Scotus safeguards divine omnipotence and 
freedom to an extreme degree. As a consequence, there is the potential in 
Duns' teaching that God may not be essentially reliable any more. 
Finally, Duns Scotus would also incorporate the articles on individuation 
in his thinking. We recall that Thomas Aquinas, among others, suggested 
that the individuating factor was matter (materia).  Consequently, he had 
to assume that immaterial beings, such as angels, were not individuals of a 
species, because, as they  are immaterial, they lack the individuating principle. 
Consequently, Thomas had to assume that each angel is its own species. We 
also saw that this solution, which provided a simple and coherent answer 
to the problem, was  not only criticised  and rejected,  but also  explicitly 
condemned in 1277.  Consequently,  Scotus  had to find  another solution 
to this problem. The  Subtle  Doctor introduced a  new concept into the 
discussion: haecceity (haecceitas, "thisness"). Haecceity denotes a substantial 
attribute that makes something an individual. Thus  a horse has a horse-
nature, which is its quiddity (quidditas, "whatness"), that makes this object 
a horse. At the same time, it has something that individuates it,  i.e.,  that 
makes this horse this particular horse. Thus the individual horse Red Rum 
is derived from the idea of the horse in the divine mind, together with the 
haecceity of  Red Rum. Obviously, for a material being like a horse, matter is 
also part of  this particular horse, but it does not constitute its thisness. Thus 
Duns Scotus avoids the problems of Thomas Aquinas' approach, because 
matter is not the individuating principle. With regard to angels, each angel is 
an individual within a species. Thus he is able to stay within the boundaries 
drawn by the condemnation of 1277.  This,  however,  was  at the  cost of 
introducing novel distinctions of great subtlety, which would be rejected 
later precisely for this reason. 
UNINTENDED  CONSEQUENCES 
The prohibition of  1277, however, had significant unintended consequences. 
Some natural philosophers and even theologians took seriously the idea 
40 Eugenio Randi,  "A  Scotist Way of Distinguishing between God's Absolute and Ordained 
Powers;' in From Ockham to Wyclif(eds Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1987), 44-45; Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omnipotence;' 253-54. 
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that God may actually create, or have created, multiple worlds.
41  Thus they 
explored the prerequisites for this to be possible, and what followed from 
this possibility. This is not the space to go into the details of the argument. 
It will suffice to say that admitting the possibility of  multiple worlds leads to 
significant problems, for which Aristotelian physics did not have an answer. 
In the final consequence, one had to assume an empty space, a void, in which 
God had created this world and in which God could create more worlds.
42 
Thus  a  number  of natural  philosophers  and  theologians  took  the 
inversion of some of the condemned theses  of 1277  as  a  starting point 
for  philosophical  speculation.43  Together,  these  speculations  led to the 
overstretching and, finally, to the collapse of  Aristotelian physics. At the same 
time these new speculations also led to the discovery of the foundation of 
the new science, for example in the mathematical inventions of  the "Merton 
College Calculators;' a group of mathematicians who discovered important 
concepts  such  as  the  "mean  speed theorem;'  which  is  instrumental in 
calculating speed and acceleration and would become one of  the foundations 
of Galileo's new science.
44 
The consequences of the new insistence on the absolute power of God 
were not restricted to the development of physics. They also  affected the 
more fundamental issue of God's relation to creation. We have seen earlier 
that in mediaeval theology God  was generally seen as utterly reliable, not only 
because of God's revelation, but, as it were, essentially. God was committed 
to the created order, which actually partook in God's own being. The new 
emphasis on the absolute power of God would destroy this certainty. 
We  have  already  seen  above  that  Duns  Scotus  emphasises  divine 
omnipotence by giving the absolute power of God a new, prominent status 
in his theology. According to God's absolute power (potentia absoluta), God 
is free to act above the laws that God godself has established, which Scotus 
regards as God's ordained power (potentia ordinata). As a consequence, both 
the reliability of God and the established order are called into question. 
For William of Ockham, the absolute power of God does not constitute 
a separate realm of action from the ordained, as it does for Scotus. Instead, 
41  Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277:' 220. 
42 Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277:' 223-24. 
43  According  to  Grant,  "The  Condemnation  of  1277:'  220,  these  include  Godfrey  of 
Fontaines, Richard of Middleton, Ramon Lull, Johannes Basso  lis, William of Ockham, Walter 
Burley, Robert Holkot, William Ware,  Gaietanus de Thienis, Nicole Oresme and Thomas of 
Strassburg. 
44 Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277 :· 235. 
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Consequently, everything God does is according to God's potentia ordinata. 
Thus  even if God interferes with the created order, which God can still 
do subject to the prohibition of logical contradiction, then it is  ordained; 
although in some texts,  Ockham describes the miraculous work of God 
above or against the created order as  according to God's absolute power. 
Regardless  of this terminological inconsistency, Ockham's  God is  free  to 
change the created order, even the order of  salvation. For example, Ockham 
thought that in the transition from the old covenant to the new, God changed 
the order of salvation.45 
The  Ockhamist  way  of distinguishing  the  powers  of God  became 
the predominant way of thinking in the late  Middle Ages.46 As  a result, 
the understanding of the relation between God and the world changed 
significantly. First, physics and theology became separated. According to 
the old way, God and world were essentially linked. For science this meant 
that it was impossible to understand God without the world and the world 
without God.  If creation  is  now  seen  as  contingent and dependent on 
God's will alone, not on God's being, then theologians can do - actually, 
must do - without science. All they can study is  divine revelation. At the 
same time, natural philosophers and mathematicians can study the world 
without reference to God, for God is not essentially involved in the world 
any longer.  47 
45  Volker  Leppin,  Geglaubte  Wahrheit:  Das  1heologieverstiindnis  Wilhelms  von  Ockham 
(Forschungen  Zur  Kirchen- Und  Dogmengeschichte  63;  Gottingen:  Vandenhoeck  und 
Ruprecht,  1995),  50.  Older scholarship  assumed  that the Nominalist understanding of the 
distinction of powers would  lead  to  a whimsical and thus  completely unreliable God.  See 
Heiko A. Oberman, The Impact of the Reformation: Essays  (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 
8-9.  It was assumed that the unreliability of  God forced humans to find other certainty, which 
would be in the reliance of  human reason in the rationalism of the early modern period.  See 
Hans Blumenberg,  The Legitimacy of the Modern  Age (trans. Robert M.  Wallace;  Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 161-62.  Although this 
view is not tenable any longer, the order God has established here on earth is still not reliable 
anymore. God can change the order and can interfere with it. Thus the foundation of human 
existence, i.e., the reliability of the cosmos, is not given any longer. 
46  Randi has shown how Scotus' legalistic understanding of the powers exercised influence 
even after Ockham.  Randi,  ''A Scotist WaY:'  And Obermann described how thinking very 
close to  Ockham is  found in the fifteenth  century theologian  Gabriel  Biel.  See  Heiko  A. 
Oberman, The Harvest of  Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism  (3rd 
ed.; Durham: Labyrinth, 1983 ), 30-56. So it is safe to say that the distinction of  God's powers 
with an emphasis on God's absolute freedom was the predominant way of thinking in the late 
Middle Ages. 
47 Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order: An Excursion in the History of  Ideas from 
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Second, if  God can change the order or interfere with it, then the present 
created order is not reliable any longer according to natural theology. The 
only certainty for humans is the divine revelation, which is a matter of  faith, 
not of  reason. So for the rational thinker, new certainty will have to be found. 
And this will be in the reliance on human reason in the early modern period 
and the Enlightenment. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen in  this paper one particular area of  the unintended consequences 
that resulted from Bishop Tempier's condemnation of  Aristotelian teaching 
at Paris. I am quite certain that the bishop would turn in his grave if he 
knew the long-term result of  his action. Instead of enhancing orthodoxy at 
Paris, it became a main contributing factor in a development that eventually 
led to the separation of theology,  philosophy and physics,  of faith  and 
reason. Blumenberg has shown convincingly, even if his interpretation of 
Ockham has been questioned, that the new intellectual developments in 
the fourteenth century led to a crisis, which could be overcome only by a 
radical departure from mediaeval thought, and which eventually found its 
expression in the rationalist philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.48 
For  the  theologian,  the debate  about the  transformation  of Western 
thinking in the late Middle Ages underlines that all human understanding of 
God is historically contingent. No part of (at least Western) Christianity can 
claim to be in direct continuity with pre-modern or even early Christianity, 
as,  for  example,  James  I. Packer  claims  for  the  evangelical  movement: 
"[Evangelicalism]  is,  we  maintain,  the  oldest  version  of Christianity; 
theologically regarded, it is apostolic Christianity itsel£:'49 
Contrary to such claims, everyone is part of the new view of God and 
the world that emerged in the late Middle Ages.  Both modern theism, in 
whatever form, and the rejection of that God in modern atheism are based 
on this new view.  Any understanding of revelation is then based on this 
Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 77-84, esp. p. 81. See also Oberman, 
Tile Impact of  the Reformation, 9-10; and Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277:' 243-44. 
48  This is  the main thesis of Blumenberg, Ihe Legitimacy of the Modern Age.  This is not to 
pass  any judgement on this  development.  I believe  that the modern world view and  the 
development of science have brought great benefit to humankind. But we need to be aware of 
the contingent nature of the way in which we ourselves are thinking, and much of this can be 
traced back to 1277. 
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the  world.  Consequently,  the  theologian,  formulating  a  contemporary 
understanding of God or in dialogue with other traditions, has to be aware 
that his or her understanding of  the divine and its relation to the world is not 
God given or innate to human nature, but the result of complex historical 
developments. 
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